Tag Archives: Federal Reserve

Significant Rollback of Dodd-Frank Signed Into Law

by Kwon-Yong Jin — Monday, May 28, 2018

On May 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law “Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,” to date the most significant rollback of the financial regulatory framework set up by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (enacted in 2010). The bill had previously passed the Senate in March and the House […]

Fed Governance Reform Goes Mainstream

by Peter Conti-Brown — Tuesday, May 24, 2016

In the debate just concluded with friend and co-blogger Daniel Hemel, I mentioned that the constitutional issues around Fed governance—and there are serious questions, Daniel and I both agree—can obscure the policy issue around Fed governance. The Constitution provides here a minimum, not a maximum. As I mention in my book, the constitutional remedies do […]

The Case for the Federal Reserve Banks’ Constitutionality is Uneasy Indeed, part II: Appointing and Removing the Reserve Bank Presidents

by Peter Conti-Brown — Wednesday, May 18, 2016

In my last post, I wrote about whether the Reserve Bank presidents were more like the CEO of the Girl Scouts or Warren Buffett on the one hand, or officers of the United States exercising significant government authority on the other. I think the answer is the latter, especially in light of how much authority […]

The Case for the Federal Reserve Banks’ Constitutionality is Uneasy Indeed, part I: Is the Fed More Like the Girl Scouts or the Government?

by Peter Conti-Brown — Friday, Apr. 22, 2016

My many thanks again to Chris Walker, the Journal editors, and the many contributors for a very stimulating symposium on my book, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve. I wanted to write today (and, because these issues end up taking so much space to unpack, in a subsequent post as well) to push […]

The Administrative Law of the Federal Reserve: The Path Ahead

by Peter Conti-Brown — Tuesday, Apr. 12, 2016

What a pleasure it has been to read these reviews. As I set out to write The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve , this very audience—serious scholars and practitioners of administrative law who had thought hard about institutional design in other contexts besides the Fed—weighed heavily as one of the primary groups of […]

Zeitgeists: The Federal Reserve in its Evolving Regulatory Context

by Aaron Nielson — Monday, Apr. 11, 2016@Aaron_L_Nielson

Readers are hard to please. It is bad enough that we criticize books that we could not even begin to write. But even worse, when an author has penned something that we like, all too often our response is not “thank you” but rather “more please”—and sometimes we don’t say “please.” I confess that after […]

The Call of the Siren and Federal Agency Independence: Independence from Whom?, by Anna Williams Shavers

by Guest Blogger — Monday, Apr. 11, 2016

When an independent agency is created, from whom does it gain independence – the President, Congress, or the people? Maybe the better question is whether it is really independent at all. One thing in particular that caught my eye is Peter Conti-Brown’s focus in Part III on the independence of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) […]

Central Banks? Why?, by Janet Monteros

by Guest Blogger — Friday, Apr. 8, 2016

A sincere thank you to Peter Conti-Brown for his efforts to reach the public in his book The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve. First, I begin by revealing that my practice is far removed geographically and figuratively from those who ponder the rationale for the power and independence of the Federal Reserve. My […]

Four Comments on Conti-Brown’s The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve, by Marshall Breger

by Guest Blogger — Friday, Apr. 8, 2016

I join my fellow colleagues in praising Peter Conti-Brown’s The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve. The book provides an insightful history of the Federal Reserve since its 1913 inception and is a powerful account of the extent to which “personnel is policy.” In particular, I note his nuanced understanding of “agency independence” as […]

Of Independence, Sovereignty, Accountability, and Other Sleights of Hand

by Seth Davis — Thursday, Apr. 7, 2016

Administrative law doctrine and scholarship has traditionally treated agencies as unitary entities and focused upon the proper allocation of authority among agencies, the President, Congress, and the courts. Recently, however, scholars have begun to unlock the “black box” of agency design to identify and evaluate the ways in which administrative law rules allocate decisionmaking authority […]