The D.C. Circuit published one opinion last week, which did not deal with administrative law. It did, however, deal with a high-profile issue: criminal prosecutions stemming from January 6.

United States v. Griffin posed the question, what does it mean for a person to “‘knowingly enter[]’ the restricted safety zone [around the Vice President]” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1752. Judge Pillard, in an opinion for the court joined by Judge Rogers, answered that question as follows and affirmed the judgment of conviction:

The defendant says a person “knowingly enters” the restricted safety zone only if he knows that the basis of the restriction is to safeguard a Secret Service protectee. Id. § 1752(a)(1). We hold that knowingly breaching the restricted area suffices, even without knowing the basis of the restriction—here, the presence of Vice President Pence at the Capitol on January 6—which merely confirms that such trespasses are within Congress’s legislative authority. Traditional tools of statutory interpretation establish that Congress intended to criminalize trespasses endangering Secret Service protectees regardless of the trespasser’s awareness of the basis for Congress’s authority to regulate them. And a contrary interpretation would impair the Secret Service’s ability to protect its charges. It would require Secret Service agents preventing members of the public from encroaching on a temporary security zone to confirm that each intruder knows that a person under Secret Service protection is or is expected to be there. Neither the text nor the context of the statute supports that reading. . . .

We hold that the grounds immediately surrounding the U.S. Capitol qualified as a “restricted building or grounds” under section 1752, and that they were adequately “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted” when Griffin clambered over a stone wall and jumped inside. And we hold that a conviction for knowingly entering and remaining on such grounds in violation of section 1752(a)(1) required only that Griffin knew that he had entered or remained in a “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted” area where he was not authorized to be. The government was not required to prove that Griffin was aware that the Vice President’s presence was the reason the grounds remained restricted. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

Judge Katsas wrote a dissenting opinion that would have applied the express knowledge requirement to both elements of the statutory definition:

This appeal turns on the scope of an express knowledge requirement in a criminal statute that protects the President, the Vice President, and other high officials from trespassers. The statute prohibits knowingly entering a “restricted building or grounds,” 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1), which is a defined term. First, the area must be “posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted.” Id. § 1752(c)(1). Second, as relevant here, it must be one where “the President or other person protected by the Secret Service is or will be temporarily visiting.” Id. § 1752(c)(1)(B). The question presented is whether a defendant, to be convicted under section 1752(a)(1), must know that the “restricted building or grounds” satisfies one or both elements of this statutory definition. My colleagues hold that a defendant must know that the area satisfies the first element of the definition but need not know that it satisfies the second. In my view, the defendant must know that the area satisfies both elements.